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NOTES AND COMMENTS

lic service company, or any complainant. Indiana 8 allows appeal by
any person, association, or city adversely affected. In Oklahoma, a
constitutional provision19 gives the right of appeal to any corporation
affected, any person deeming himself aggrieved, or the state.
It seems improbable that the North Carolina legislature intended to
limit the right of appeal as it was limited in the principal case. As is
20
pointed out above, it appears that the best law is against that holding. *
However, the precedents to which the courts must look for guidance in
construing the statutes being as conflicting as they are, it would seem
advisable for the legislature to change the law so as clearly to give the
right of appeal to either the defendant corporation, the state, or any
affected person appearing before the commission and participating in
the hearing regardless of a showing of a property interest.
EDWIN N. MANER, JR.
Constitutional Law-Racial Discrimination-Discriminatory
Salary Schedules of Negro Schoolteachers Prohibited
by Fourteenth Amendment
Plaintiff, a negro schoolteacher, brought an action for a declaratory
judgment as to the legality of the action of the Board of Education of
Nashville, Tennessee, in setting up different schedules of compensation
f6r white and colored teachers of the same professional rating, for injunction against such future discrimination, and for past salary alleged
to be due on the basis of the difference between the white and the colored schedules. The federal district court made findings of fact that
the board had followed the schedules, that the only basis for the different scales was race or color, and held that such a distinction was a
denial of equal protection of laws and so violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The declaratory judgment and the injunction were granted, but
recovery of back salary was denied because the negro plaintiff had
accepted the smaller amount in the past without protest. 1
The instant case provides one more step in the slow advancement of
18 Acts "of Indiana 1927, c. 258, §1.
OKaLA. CoNsT.,

Art. IX, §20.

'0. Corporation Commission v. Cannon Mfg. Co., 185 N. C. 17, 116 S. E. 178
(1923). The Southern Power Co. -petitioned the Corporation Commission to fix
reasonable rates. On the filing of the petition, the commission had notices issued
and served on all customers under contract with the petitioner. Various customers
appeared and objected to the proposed rates. From the commission's decision, the
customers were allowed an appeal. (Appeal dismissed on other grounds.)
In State ex ret. Board of Railroad Commissioners v. Wilmington and Weldon
R. R. Co., 122 N. C. 877, 29 S. E. 334 (1898), the petitioners had begun a proceeding before the commission to require the railroad to build a station. From
the commission's finding, the petitioners appealed directly to the supreme.court.
It was held that the appeal would lie to the superior court and then to the supreme
court.
'Thomas v. Hibbitts, 46 F. Supp. 368 (M. D. Tenn. 1942).
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the negro in the South as a result of the protection afforded by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 2 The question presented
here, however, is not a new one. It first arose in Maryland in 1939,
where a negro teacher sought to enjoin the enforcement of a state
statute setting up similar discriminatory salary schedules. Although
the case was first dismissed for want of parties,5 the court on second
suit granted an injunction to the extent the statute authorized and the
board of education carried out a purely racial discrimination. 4* The
court, recognizing the possibility of differences in the individuals themselves, said that salaries for the two races did not have to be equal, but
that it would be hard to find any legal justification for paying a negro
teacher less than the minimum required for a white teacher of the same
standard professional qualifications and experience, for such difference
in pay would seem to be clearly based solely on race or color. Herein
seems to lie the whole crux of the problem, for where, as here, there
are definite professional standards by which the worth of the teacher
may be measured, an almost prima facie case of racial discrimination
arises, whereas if the standard was that of the skill or innate ability
of the individual teacher such a discrimination would be less apparent.s*
The doctrine of the Maryland case has been incorporated into two other
degisions besides the instant caseO* so that it would now appear to be
settled law that wherever a county or state board of education sets up
different salary schedules for white and colored teachers there is a
prima facie case of discrimination solely on the basis of race or color.
In the instant case, the defense argued that the different economic
positions of the white and colored teachers, which allowed the latter to
'U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV, §1.
' Mills v. Lowndes, 26 F. Supp. 792 (D. Md. 1939). This action was brought
against the members of the state board of education, and the court held that
although the state fixed the basic salary schedules the county board of education
was an indispensable party to the suit because it administered them.
" Mills v. Board of Education of Anne Arundel County, 30 F. Supp. 245
(D. Md. 1939). The court refused to declare the statei statute unconstitutional
on its face, for it was the county practice rather than the mere terms of the
statute which prejudiced the plaintiff. This was on the theory that the state only
fixed the minimum salaries and the actual salaries were in the discretion of the
county board. It would seem that since the payment of teachers' salaries is generally a local matter any suit of this nature would have to join the county board
of education as defendant.
5"See Notes (1940) 27 VA. L. REv. 245, (1940) 3 LA. L. Rav. 232, (1941) 1
BILL OF RIGHTs Rv. 142 to the effect that cases involving discriminations as to
teachers salaries should not be precedents for holding unconstitutional any wage
discriminations against non-professional groups.
"Alston v. School Board of City of Norfolk, 112 F. (2d) 992, 130 A. L. R.
1506 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940). The action was dismissed in the district court on the
ground that the plaintiff's entry into a contract with the school board to teach
for a year at a fixed price constituted a waiver of such constitutional rights as
he was seeking. The court held that if the rights were waived it was only for the
term of the contract and thus the question was still pertinent as to future rights.
McDaniel v. Board of Public Instruction, 39 F. Supp. 638 (N. D. Fla. 1941).
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live more cheaply, and the fact that colored teachers were more numerous and could be employed at lower salaries, justified the lower rates of
pay. This defense was recognized as being good in the abstract, but
the court gave considerable import to the fact that even though the use
of colored teachers would be more economical there was no showing
that they were used in white schools, and therefore the defense was held
invalid.7 Such would still seem to be so even if the teachers were used
interchangeably, for then, in addition to the same professional qualifications, there would-be the same type of work, making a stronger case
for equal pay. Also there is no sociological justification for giving legal
significance to the fact that the negroes' low standard of living allows
them to live more cheaply, and it would seem that the Fourteenth
Amendment should extend to the prevention of any state action which
tends to perpetuate a negro standard of living which is lower than that
of whites. The increasing importance of the state as an employer,
which results in employment of many different types of labor,8 intensifies this need for racial protection.
There seem to be no cases involving a state discrimination as to
wages of other kinds of workers.9* This is probably due to the fact that
there is no other definite class which includes both colored and white persons where such definite wage scales are set up. However, the budgetary
problems of the counties require the setting. up of these wage rates. If
the counties changed from these schedules based on education and years
of experience to some standard less objective, or even dropped the schedules entirely, the prima facie case of discrimination would seem to disappear. Proof of discrimination would then probably require a showing
of systematic and continuous differences in the wages, or that the colored teachers were not being paid on substantially the same basis as
the whites.
The first of these proofs would be analogous to the test set up in
-determining whether due process has been denied in the trial of a negro
7 Thonas

v. Hibbitts, 46 F. Supp. 368, 370 (M.D. Tenn. 1942).
sSee Note (1940) 53 HAnv. L. REv. 669 discussing the limitations on the state
as an employer under the Fourteenth Amendment.
"*The only cases analogous in this respect to the instant decision involve
limitations placed by the state or its municipalities upon the letting of a public
contract. In Heim v. McCall, 239 U. S. 175, 36 S. Ct. 78, 60 L. ed. 218 (1915),
the court held that a statute providing that a public contractor could not hire

aliens was constitutional as a proper exercise of control over public works. Also
see Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207, 24 S. Ct. 124, 51 L. ed. 1047 (1903) to the
effect that a state could insert hour limitations into public contracts, and People
v. City of Chicago, 278 Ill. 318, 116 N. E. 158 (1917) where it was held con-

stitutional for a board of education to deny employment to teachers who were
union members. These cases seem to be contrary to the attitude of the teachers'
salary cases in that they allow the state to impose restrictions on the hiring of
public employees without considering such restrictions a denial of equal protection
of the laws.
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defendant before a wholly white jury. In such case it must be determined'whether there has been a long continuous, systematic and arbitrary exclusion of the negroes solely on the basis of race or color, and
not whether there was an exclusion of negro jurors at that particular
trial.' 0
The second method of showing discrimination would seem to more
closely follow the test set up by the courts as to whether there has been
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by discrimination between
white and colored children in other fields of education. The question
there is not whether the facilities provided for each are actually equal,
but whether they are substantially equal. The leading case on this point
is State of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, in which the Supreme
Court of the United States held that the state of Missouri was bound
to furnish within its borders facilities for negro legal education substantially equal to those which"it there afforded the white race, whether
or not any negroes other than the plaintiff sought the same opportunity."" This case, however, may be somewhat limited in its application of the substantial equality doctrine in that at the time of the suit
there was no intrastate legal education for negroes provided by the state
at all, and thus the court did not go into a comparison of facilities. The
extent of the holding was that scholarships to law schools without the
state were not sufficient to meet the requirements of substantial equality.
In this respect the decision may be strengthened by the interpretation
placed upon it by the Supreme Court of Missouri on remand that the
law school facilities for negroes at Lincoln University would have to
be substantially the same as those provided for whites by the beginning
of the next term.' 2* This opinion was respected in a later federal case
in announcing that the opinion in the Gaines case "did not deprive the
state of a reasonable opportuhity to provide facilities demanded for the
first time, before it abrograted its established policy of segregation."' 3'
oNorris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587, 55 S. Ct. 579, 79 L. ed. 1074 (1935). Even
though there were no definite schedules set up, it would seem that if the plaintiff
could show that for a long time there had been systematic-wage differences he
would have a case of discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment.
1- 305 U. S. 337, 59 S. Ct.232, 83 L. ed. 208 (1938) ; accord, Pearson v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 At]. 590, 103 A. L. R. 706 (1936) holding that where
Maryland provided for outside scholarships there was a denial of substantial
equality.
'"State ex reL. Gaines v. Canada(, 344 Mo. 1238, 131 S. W. (2d) 217 (1939).
Since the rendition of the Gaines decision the state had enacted legislation charging
the curators of the negro institution of higher education, Lincoln University, with
a mandatory duty to erect any additional buildings and provide for any additional
facilities which might be requested. This new statute probably influenced the
court to allow a reasonable time for the school to provide the facilities before a
mandamus could be obtained which would permit the, petitioner to enter the white
law school.
I" Bluford v. Canada, 32 F. Supp. 707 (W. D. Mo. 1940). The negro plaintiff
had been denied admission to the graduate school of journalism at the University
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The doctrine that the facilities provided for white and colored children must be substantially equal has also been widely recognized
throughout those'states which follow a policy of racial segregation for
educational purposes. The rule is well stated in a leading Kansas case:
"Any classification which preserves substantially equal school advantages is not prohibited by either the state or the federal Constitution,
nor would it contravene the provisions of either."' 14 Under this doctrine, where the negroes had to walk a greater distance to school than
the whites,15 where a new building was being erected for white students
but not for colored,'e " where a negro girl was not allowed to room in
the same Home Economics House with the white students, 17. and where
the negroes were given no representation on the board of education of
the district,1 8 it was held that the facilities were substantially equal and
thus no discrimination existed. On the other hand, where the colored
and white children attended school for the same total number of years,
but different numbers of years were allotted to grammar, junior high,
and high schools,'9* where the curriculum in the white school included
of Missouri (white) and was bringing action for damages against the registrar.
There was, however, no allegation in the complaint of application and refusal at
Lincoln University (colored) before the suit was brought, and the court said
such demand and refusal would have to be shown before there could be any
recovery. The court considered that the opinion in the Gaines case should not
imply that the state had to abrogate its racial segregation policy for the short
time required to set up the negro facilities.
1
,Reynolds v. Board of Education, 66 Kan. 672, 72 Pac. 274 (1903).
1
Lehew v. Brummell, 103 Mo. 546, 15 S. W. 765, 11 L. R. A. 828 (1891);
accord, Dameron v. Bayless, 14 Ariz. 180, 126 Pac. 273 (1912).
Lowery v. School Trustees, 140 N. C. 33, 52 S. E. 267 (1905). Since there
were 307 white children and only 68 colored children it was found that the erection
of the building for additional accommodation of white children was necessary,
but that the building for colored children was amply sufficient and commodious.
State v. Board of Trustees, 126 0. St. 290, 185 N. E. 196 (1933).. The
plaintiff was offered quarters and opportunity to pursue her residence service in
such house in one of its compartments which was furnished and equipped in an
equivalent and similar manner as the compartments which she wanted to enter with
the white students, and the court held that she was not being denied educational;but
merely social, privileges. In Jones v. Newlon, 81 Col. 25, 253 Pac. 386, 50 A. L. R.
1263 (1927), it was held that exclusion of colored pupils from the swimming pool
and entertainments and other social functions was a violation of a Colorado constitutional provision that no classification of pupils should be made because of
race or color; accord, Patterson v. Board of Education of City of Trenton, 11
N. J. Misc. 179, 164 Atl. 892 (1933), aff'd, 112 N. J.L. 99, 169 Atl. 690 (1934).
It would seem then that in states which do not follow a policy of segreg4tiog
mere separations as to social functions would constitute illegal discrimination.
" State v. Albritton, 98 Okla. 158, 224 Pac. 511 (1924). It was held that even
though there was a majority of negro students in the district the determination
of whether the board was to be composed of white or colored members was in
the discretion of the superintendent of schools, and since there was no showing that
the action of the superintendent resulted in unequal accommodations, there was
no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
10* Graham v. Board of Education of Topeka, "153 Kan. 840, 114 P. (2d) '313
(1941). The court went into the method of teaching in each ot the schools,
showing that the junior high school for white children was departmentalized and
had different teachers for each course, but that such was not the case in the
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mechanical and other special instruction not given in the colored
school,20 where the county was authorized to establish one agricultural
high school for white youth and support it by a tax on all taxable property,21 and where the negro children had to cross dangerous railroad
tracks to get to school, 22 it was held that there were such substantial
inequalities as constituted a racial discrimination. From these cases it
is seen that, given a policy of segregation of races by the state for education, compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment depends upon whether
the facilities provided for each race are substantially the same. The
courts also seem to apply this criterion in all the teacher salary cases.
They evidently recognize that even though a definite schedule exists the
individual salaries need not be exactly equal, but that a discriminatory
schedule would show prima fade that the wage classification is determined by race or color and thus that a violation of the substantial
equality doctrine would exist. If then there were no schedules, the
negro plaintiff would have the burden of showing that his wages were
not being determined in substantially the same way as those of the white
teachers. The proof of such contention would require consideration of
the ability, efficiency, skill, experience and educational qualifications of
the individual teacher and the type of students and courses taught,
whereas the salary schedules -are based solely upon his experience- and
education.
North Carolina has a constitutional provision which requires that
the races shall be separated for purposes of education, but that there
shall be no discrimination against either,23 and such segregation has
long been the policy of the state.24* This provision has been recognized
as not requiring exact equality of school advantages, but only that the
facilities be substantially the same in view of the varying needs of the
two races. 25* North Carolina then would seem to be in accord with
negro seventh and eighth grades.

See Note (1942)

10 J. B. A. KAN. 285 dis-

cussing the tendency of Kansas to require absolute rather than substantial equality.
'0Jones v. Board of Education, 90 Okla. 233, 217 Pac. 400 (1923).
1 McFarland v. Goins,. 96 Miss. 67, 50 So. 493 (1909).
2
Williams v. Board of Education, 79 Kan. 202, 99 Pac. 216 (1908).
"' N. C. CoxsT., Art. IX, §2. "....

and the children of the white race and the

children of the colored race shall be taught in separate public schools; but there
shall be no discrimination in favor of, or to the prejudice of, either race."
2 * Although the constitutional and statutory provisions relate only to public
schools, it has been the policy to extend them to higher education also. N. C.
CODE
ANN. (Michie, 1939) §5384. See Note 17 N. C. L. REv. 280 (1939).
25
"Lowery-v. School Trustees, 140 N. C. 33, 52 S. E. 267 (1905). The doctrine which requires facilities and advantages to be substantially equal was probably first recognized by the North Carolina court in McMillan v. School Committee,
107 N. C. 609, 615, 12 S.E. 330, 331 (1890) where it quotes from an Ohio case
which advanced the doctrine. In two earlier cases, Pruit v. Commissioners, 94
N. C. 709 (1886), and Rigsbee v. Durham, 94 N. C. 800 (1886) the court held
that where the poll and property taxes collected from whites were to be devoted
to sustaining schools for white persons, and the taxes collected from negroes were

19431

NOTES AND COMMENTS

most other states in this respect, and should a case arise in its courts
involving salary discriminations between colored and white teachers it
would be possible to decide the case under the substantial equality
doctrine.
The problem of the instant case is still very much alive throughout
the Southern states, for statistics of comparative colored and white teachers' salaries for 1935-1936 in seventeen states show that for every $1.00
paid to white teachers only about $.50 was paid to colored. 26 North
Carolina seems to be somewhat more liberal than the average, the ratio
at that time being $.67 to the negro per $1.00 to the white, 27 and in
1940-1941 $.79,to the negro for each $1.00 per white.2 8 * The general
policy of North Carolina evidently seeks to bring about an equalization
of teachers' saliries, 29* but there is still some room for improvement.
It would seem that unless complete minimum equalization is achieved a
suit for injunction against such discrimination is likely to arise which,
if successful, would impose a critical and sudden strain on the educa-

tional budget.

C. D.

HOGUE, JR.

Mortgages and Deeds of Trust-Statute of Limitations Barring
Foreclosures and Right of Redemption-Nature
of Possession Required
Civil action in ejectment.1 The facts were agreed to be as follows:
The plaintiff, in the year 1925, executed a deed of trust securing notes
made by him for the balance due on the purchase price of the land
covered by the trust deed. The last of the notes matured in 1928. In
1938, more than ten years after the maturity date of the last note, the
trustee foreclosed and conveyed the land to defendant by exercising the
power of sale contained in the trust instrument. No payment of either
principal or interest was ever made on any of the notes.
to be used for colored schools, the tax was discriminatory and void under the
state constitution.
" Special Problems of Negro Education (Wilkerson, 1939). Prepared for
Advisory Committee on Education, Staff Study Number 12. Published by United

States Government Printing Office, p. 24, Table.
2"Ibid.

*State School Facts (Feb., 1942), Vol. XIV, No. 5, Table II. From this
table it is seen that there has been a continuous increase in all salaries throughout

the years and also a more rapid increase in negro wages than in white wages.
There has thus been a tendency to equalize the salaries. This table does not
show the exact situation, for it only covers salaries paid from state funds, and
those paid by the individual counties might make some difference.
8* See Greensboro Daily News, June 12, 1942, §1, p. 12, col. 2, stating that
there was a $242,000 appropriation in 1942 for the purpose of furthering the
equalization of teachers' salaries, and that the State School Commission hopes to

have all differences between colored and white teachers' salaries abolished within
two or three years.
I Ownbey v. Parkway Properties, Inc., 222 N. C. 54, 21 S.E. (2d) 900 (1942).

